More recent theoretical literature had acknowledged the two-sidedness of war, Goemans writes, but here, too, important aspects had been missed. War theory imported from economics the concept of “bargaining”, and wars were thought to begin when the bargaining process—over a piece of territory, usually—broke down. The most common cause of the breakdown, according to war theorists (and again borrowing from economics), was some form of informational asymmetry. Simply put, one or both sides overestimated their own strength relative to their opponent’s. There were many reasons for this sort of informational asymmetry, not least of which was that the war-fighting capacity of individual nations was almost always a closely guarded secret. In any case, the best way to find out who was stronger was to actually start fighting. Then things became clear quite quickly. Many wars ended in just this way, with the sides reëvaluating their relative strengths and opting to make a deal.
But there were other kinds of wars, in which factors besides information predominated. These factors, in part because they did not play prominent roles in economics, were less well understood. One was the fact that contracts in the international system—in this case, peace deals—had little or no enforcement mechanism. If a country really wanted to break a deal, there was no court of arbitration to which the other party could appeal. (In theory, the United Nations could be this court; in practice, it is not.) This gave rise to the problem known as “credible commitment”: one reason wars might not end quickly is that one or both sides simply could not trust the other to honor any peace deal they reached.
Keith Gessen
Ostensibly written about the war in Ukraine, this article does a much more interesting job than most of linking the current conflict with similar instances in history and war theory in general – arriving at the well accepted conclusion that this war won’t end quickly, as neither side is willing to back down and reassess its minimum war goals.
The trouble, Goemans found, lay with the leaders who were neither democrats nor dictators: because they were repressive, they often met with bad ends, but because they were not repressive enough, they had to think about public opinion and whether it was turning on them. These leaders, Goemans found, would be tempted to “gamble for resurrection”, to continue prosecuting the war, often at greater and greater intensity, because anything short of victory could mean their own exile or death. He reminded me that on November 17, 1914—four months after the First World War began—Kaiser Wilhelm II met with his war cabinet and concluded that the war was unwinnable.
Still, they fought on for another four years, Goemans said.And the reason was that they knew that if they lost they would be overthrown, there would be a revolution.And they were right. Leaders like these were very dangerous. According to Goemans, they were the reason that the First World War, and many others, had dragged on much longer than they should have.
One assertion I rather disagree with is the high importance the author places on this conflict and its outcome for the international order. I don’t think this will shape the rest of the twenty-first century
– the world has much bigger issues to face over the coming decades, from the US–China rivalry to the looming consequences of global warming. Unless, of course, the conflict escalates through the use of weapons of mass destruction or spreads to other countries as it goes on…
But there is another way to think about this whole issue. If you believe world events are only imperfectly interconnected, then what happens in Ukraine is important but not likely to determine the fate of the planet. In this view, dramatic shifts of the sort described above happen rarely—and typically only when a great power collapses entirely and the entire structure of world politics is transformed. Most of the time, states adjust their policies to try to keep the strongest power(s) in check, balances of power tend to reform, and even one-sided victories typically create new problems rather than perpetual peace.
People who see the world this way agree that helping Ukraine defend itself is desirable on both moral and strategic grounds and that outside support should continue. But however much they might applaud a Ukrainian victory and the removal of all Russian troops from Ukrainian soil, they don’t think the question of who controls the Donbas will have much impact on China’s policy toward Taiwan, Iran’s nuclear decision-making, the refugee crisis in Africa and Central America, or the war between Ethiopia and Eritrea. They suspect rifts in Europe will continue even if Ukraine is triumphant and that these divisions are likely to increase once today’s heightened fears of Russia diminish. A defeated Russia would be chastened for a while, but new Russian leaders might be as uncomfortable with U.S. dominance as Putin has been and still capable of mischief-making in several places. The internal challenges facing the democracies of the West would not disappear after a victory parade in Kyiv, and local rivalries and conflicting interests would continue to bedevil anyone who is foolish enough to try to dictate the political evolution of a diverse and divided planet.
Stephen M. Walt
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