A Trump win would immediately revive plans for more common EU debt for the bloc’s security and defense. That idea — initially pushed by Macron and supported by the EU’s new High Representative Kaja Kallas — had even won the tacit support of frugal Northern Europe, but it lost momentum after the French president’s election gambit. The shock of a second Trump term would undoubtedly rekindle it, not least because Germany — the country most reluctant to support Macron’s ideas — is also the country that fears losing America’s security guarantee most.
The same would be true for the Continent’s gloomy economic outlook. Former Central Bank President Mario Draghi’s diagnosis of an €800 billion-per-year investment gap can only be filled by more common financing. It also requires a different approach to EU-wide industrial and fiscal policy that, again, would start in Germany and spill over to rest of the EU — something that a trade war with Trump could help unlock.
Mujtaba Rahman
That may have been the case if Trump would have won a second term back in 2020, but I fear that now in 2024 and beyond the prospects of catalyzing European unity are much slimmer. European leaders have had another four years of ‘American leadership’ under Biden to lull them into complacency – I am using ‘leadership’ here in quotes as this was rather America pursuing its militaristic haphazard foreign policy and European leaders tagging along and pretending US interests perfectly match our own.
Internally, European countries are suffering a serios vacuum of leadership – not a particularly new issue, but it seems to have worsened lately. Macron’s position in France was weakened by his misguided decision to call early elections; the German Ampel coalition disbanded the day after the US elections, meaning they will soon head into elections as well; the new Labour government in the UK seems conflicted whether or how to reboot ties with the EU, while the Tories are so deep into their fantasies about a special relationship with the US that they cannot envision any other role for the UK; Poland, for all the hype in the press about its military spending, doesn’t have the budget to sustain it, and a return of the former ruling party would radically alter its decisions and relationship with European partners; and the Ursula von der Leyen as the past and future head of the European Commission seems all too eager to adopt US’ foreign policy stances (especially in regards to Israel), despite not having any competence on these matters and no consensus from individual states. It’s hard to imagine a consistent strong response to Trump from this bunch, and with many countries in Eastern Europe clinging to the dated notion that America is their defender of last resort against big-bad Russia.
Europe is screwed. Trump doesn’t see the United States’ European allies as a strategic asset, and he’s long been openly hostile to the European Union. He has referred to the EU as an enemy in the past and thought Brexit was a terrific idea because he understood that the EU could speak with one voice on economic issues and was therefore harder for the United States to push around. The GOP is dead set against most, if not all, forms of regulation, and people like Elon Musk oppose Europe’s more stringent rules on digital privacy. Look for Trump to ignore Brussels, focus on bilateral relations with European countries where the United States is in a much stronger position, and do whatever he can to weaken or divide the EU itself. It’s possible that this danger will lead Europeans to band together in opposition (as French President Emmanuel Macron keeps advocating), but it’s more likely that every nation will look out for itself.
Stephen M. Walt
It doesn’t take a mastermind to assume that Trump will easily play on these divisions to obstruct any attempts of building a European common front and to extract concessions and lucrative business deals. Already, von der Leyen considers buying more American LNG – replacing a dependency on cheap Russian gas with a dependency on expensive American gas doesn’t seem such a bright idea considering how inconsistent American policy has become – and weapons will surely be on the menu soon enough. Orban will be more than happy to block unanimous EU-level decisions in exchange for small US favors – and many leaders will adopt the same transactional attitude to redirect Trump’s ire towards someone, anyone else.
We can expect increased pressure to drop antitrust and regulatory actions against American companies – certainly not a first, as the Biden administration never shied away from pressuring other governments to align with its policy against China – and even overt threats of dropping American security guarantees if we don’t comply. And obviously we can forget concerted action to curb climate change; with this choice, the American electorate has sealed the world into catastrophic warming and its dire consequences.
It’s certainly a possibility that the geopolitical situation will just muddle along, with governments reluctant to take bold actions because Trump’s chaotic nature makes it difficult to assess his reaction. He may well decide to delegate the pesky business of governing to his aides, be it his chief of staff or his VP and his clique of oligarchs, leading to more predictable policies – which could nevertheless hurt Europe in many ways.
Personally, I think the Russian military threat is overstated; we are coming up on three years of intense fighting and it still hasn’t made decisive inroads into Ukraine, and it apparently needs North Korean reinforcements to reclaim a bit of territory stormed by Ukrainian troops this summer. With Finland’s entry into NATO, the border with Russia is much longer that the current front in Ukraine, which would stretch Russian troops even thinner. But being caught between two adversaries, fighting multiple crisis simultaneously, is never a favorable position to be in, so outlook on the next years is bleak…
Even if we manage to navigate these opposing forces, the decisions we will have to make to appease Trump will divert investments away from regional development and energy transition towards defense, leading to less growth and overall welfare. Which in turn will foment popular dissatisfaction and sustain the shift towards radical candidates promising to overturn the establishment – just as it has happened in the US. And, since so many still look up to American culture for reasons foreign to me, there will be no shortage of people thoughtlessly assuming Trump’s rejection of science and liberalism, eager to feel vindicated for their ‘alternative thinking’ that lacks any connection to reality and human decency.
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