Sanctions, however, shouldn’t be judged solely on the amount of damage they do a targeted economy. The principal objective of economic pressure isn’t to punish a nation for atrocious behavior, bankrupt a country’s finances, or register disapproval about an adversary’s foreign policy — it’s to push a country’s political leadership into changing its behavior in a more positive direction. In the case of Russia, this means compelling Putin to end his aggression in Ukraine, either by withdrawing his forces from the country or entering into serious peace negotiations with Kyiv.
Needless to say, neither of those objectives have been accomplished — and it’s increasingly difficult to envision Putin simply throwing up his hands and suing for peace, particularly at the hands of Western economic pressure. Indeed, Putin appears to be as committed to his military and political objectives in Ukraine today as he was when he ordered the invasion last winter. Putin, at least as of this writing, appears to have made the calculation that succeeding in a war of choice (or at least not failing) that is now inextricably tied to his personal legacy is worth enduring long-term structural weaknesses in the Russian economy.
Daniel DePetris
A slightly older piece, but the central argument remains valid. Since then, Putin has demonstrated his commitment to sustained war by calling for a partial mobilization, running referenda to incorporate four occupied regions of Ukraine, and making renewed threats to use nuclear weapons to defend this new ‘Russian’ territory. None of this signals a willingness to back down or accept diplomatic talks. The rapid advancement of Ukrainian troops in the occupied territories should change Putin’s calculus somewhat – but for the moment it has only let to more hardening of his position.
Part of the problem remains that many countries are not participating in the sanctions regime, or are exploiting the tensions to profit from Russian trade. China, India, Saudi Arabia, and others, are buying Russian oil and gas at a discount to either use for internal consumption or resell at higher prices. OPEC recently agreed to cut oil output to push up prices, a move that many have interpreted as outright support for Russia. Other sanctioned commodities are finding alternative routes to the Russian market via parallel imports through Iran and the Eurasian Economic Union. Even Turkey, a NATO member, has apparently become a ‘warehouse and bridge’ to Russia for metals, kitchenware and machinery.
In Iraq, sanctions all but destroyed secular opposition to Saddam Hussein. Lee Jones, author of “Societies Under Siege”, told The Atlantic in 2018,
The only thing that survived were tribes, which became the core of al-Qaeda and ISIS, and Shia clerics that formed the basis of Shia political parties.A study I co-authored in 2012 showed that out of 35 authoritarian states that successfully transitioned to democracy between 1955 and 2000, only South Africa did so while under broad economic sanctions. Of the 12 states that were under embargo-level sanctions during this period, only one, South Africa, transitioned to democracy.
Trita Parsi
But the core of the issue is that economic sanction actually have a poor track record of changing a country’s foreign policy or fostering democratic regime change. Instead, sanctions often play the role of a ‘common enemy’ that autocratic regimes can use to justify their repression and continued existence – Iran, North Korea and Cuba are telling examples. There’s a reasonable chance the current Russia situation is heading in a similar direction: Putin and his eventual successors leading an increasingly repressive and isolated regime, a long-term destabilizing factor for Europe and Central Asia.
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