Everything that can go wrong in urban design has gone wrong in Beijing. The climate is arid and prone to northerly sandstorms. Its streets are unwalkable, but a stroll would reveal that its imperial heritage, made up of alley houses called hutongs, is slowly being taken over by its socialist heritage, made up of gray Soviet blocks that tower over all. Beijing is therefore a desert steppe city with Stalinist characteristics. A decade ago, the city was a lively place. One can find no shortage of people reminiscing about visiting art shows and fun bars in hutongs, then grabbing roadside barbecue just outside. Today, it is a concrete no-fun zone and the most restrictive city in the country. But Beijing is redeemed by its intellectual life. It is the center not just of state power, but also universities and the biggest-dreaming startups. For those who can work up the courage to confront the mess of its urban city, a sparkling dinner awaits.
In 2018, I started to say to people that China would close its doors in 40 years, by the centenary of the country’s founding. At that point, the Celestial Empire would be secluded once more, while its people can be serenely untroubled by the turmoils of barbarians outside. Everyone reacted with disbelief, saying that there’s no way to shut down a country. But it looks like I was off only by the wrong centenary: China has been mostly shut in 2021, a hundred years after the party’s founding. I think that the government has no real exit plan for this pandemic. Any time it looks like it might relax, another variant shows up. The leadership probably has no firm aspiration to open the border at any date, and instead will assess the situation of variants and medical treatments every so often. If things don’t look good, then it won’t open up.
After all, the border closure doesn’t seem to incur significant economic costs. Goods are still flowing in and out, while people keep their spending domestic. The cost is more political, and therefore intangible. What is more easy to observe is that 99% of Chinese have no intention of going overseas. They’re terrified of the virus and think that the rest of the world is a mess.
Dan Wang
I have first encountered the concept of a China almost completely walled off from external influences in science-fiction, specifically in Alastair Reynolds’ Blue Remembered Earth; astonishing to think that it could happen before our own eyes, not over the next century as the author envisioned it.
The rule of thumb for US businesses is that China makes up half of global demand for most products, from wind turbines to structural steel; and China will account for a third to a half of expected growth over the next decade. These aren’t the figures of the Chinese government, but company projections. Of course these projections might be wrong, but US businesses feel that it’s mathematically impossible to lead the future without being active in the Chinese market.
None of them are keen to be pieces on a geopolitical chessboard. For the most part, American firms are unwilling to think too hard about the moral issues of doing business in China, choosing instead to say that Beijing’s actions are outside their scope of control. Their strategy is to keep out of the headlines while figuring out how to make more sales. One of the smart things that Beijing has done is not to retaliate against American companies for the actions of the US government; for the most part, Beijing has hugged them even closer by loosening restrictions in manufacturing and finance. Thus American companies are quietly localizing more of their Chinese production to remove their products from the jurisdiction of US controls.
Economically though, China remains very much connected to the rest of the world, as an importer of raw materials and energy products, as a major manufacturer, and important market for international companies. One has to wonder if the draconic sanctions imposed on Russia as a consequence of invading Ukraine would be even considered against China, should it start behaving aggressively towards Taiwan or other neighbors. The economic blowback on Western economies and the United States would me massive. As an example, Apple stopped sales in Russia after recent US sanctions; under similar sanctions against China, one might expect Apple to stop selling iPhones in the US, as it would be unable to import them… Considering how loudly Americans complained about moderate increases in gas prices, the consequences of sanctions on China could be met with huge public outcry.
For now, China seems content to play neutral in the current West versus Russia conflict, probably making the cold judgement that it needs both sides for its economy to run relatively smoothly (Russia as energy supplier and the West as customer), that Western anger towards Russia will take some heat off China, and that it can strengthen its position further while these two blocks are weakening themselves, at least economically. There were already some reports that China is considering increasing its stakes in Russian energy and commodities companies – a perfect opportunity, now that they are squeezed for capital and the ruble in freefall. Depending on how long the crisis lasts and how much China gets dragged into it by outside pressure, China might well emerge more dominant on the world stage.
But there’s a serious problem with the regulatory squeeze. The summer storm has battered industries and left people feeling adrift. The trouble is that the party-state looks like the God of the Old Testament: a wrathful entity that demands harrowing displays of fealty to demonstrate commitment to a values-based faith. Disobedience provokes storms and other manifestations of celestial displeasure. Compliance means not just material gifts—honey, manna, and government sponsorship of factory financing—but also the realization of national greatness.
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