Russia set up Georgia’s leader, Mikheil Saakashvili, into initiating hostilities against its proxy forces in South Ossetia, and then crushed the Georgian military in a brief conventional conflict. Saakashvili walked down that path, despite U.S. warnings, because of his own ambitions. Yet Moscow was also surprised by the timing of the Georgian attack, which somewhat pre-empted Russian plans. NATO’s declaration added a broader geostrategic dimension to a war that was already well on its way to happening given Georgia’s ambitions to retake lost territory, and Russia’s intent to deal Saakashvili a major defeat. Putin was not going to let Saakashvili take the territories back, but after NATO’s declaration at the Bucharest Summit he resolved to teach the West a lesson about Russia’s ability to veto further NATO expansion eastward.
Georgia was no great military power, but for a tiny nation it was well-armed, far beyond anything currently fielded by the Baltic states. Whether or not the Georgian military had the leadership and experience to make good use of this gear is another story. The perpetual dream of such states is to become the Israel of their region. The problem with small states is that they think they can be David, but outside of the Book of Samuel, most of the time David gets crushed by Goliath. By 2008, Saakashvili bragged that Georgia had 33,000 professional service members, 100,000 reservists, the number of tanks had increased by a factor of ten and combat helicopters by a factor of three. Georgia’s build-up was sold as an effort at achieving “NATO standards” and “interoperability”. In reality Georgia’s armed forces kept expanding in size and capability in defiance of NATO recommendations to reduce the force and make it affordable. Most of the heavy equipment Georgia procured was actually Soviet gear, with Ukrainian and Israeli upgrades, not meaningfully interoperable with NATO forces.
Michael Kofman
Interesting retrospective of the Russo-Georgian War, a brief confrontation that many quote now in relation to Putin’s imperialist tendencies and the current invasion of Ukraine – including the David vs. Goliath analogy. The quick Russian victory back then probably contributed to Putin’s boldness and expectation that he will subdue Ukraine similarly fast.
The article encourages many trains of thought. For longer timespans, it reflects the forces driving the dissolution of large empires as the balance of power between the central authority and peripheral provinces shifts. When the Soviet Union was strong, its power kept local conflicts in check. As it became weaker, nations started breaking up, declaring independence, and reviving old grudges – as it happened with Armenia and Azerbaijan as well. In recent years, Putin has consolidated the Russian central power once again, leading to his drive to reincorporate these regions under his control.
Saakashvili himself was a populist with grandiose ambitions, but he eventually indulged the return of kleptocratic tendencies in the country. His own political career as a leading figure in this conflict is no less interesting, Adrian Karatnycky offers a recent account of the rise and fall of his political fortunes. Today Saakashvili is a wanted man in Georgia, sentenced in absentia to three years, with other charges pending for abuse of power and corruption. Georgians very much want to see him again, but in prison. He is a very much unwanted man in Ukraine, having sought to revive his political fortunes as governor there. After numerous fights and scandals in Ukrainian politics, Petro Poroshenko’s government deported him to Poland in early 2018 and revoked his Ukrainian citizenship (their second attempt to boot him from the country).
It also speaks to how nation states can resort to force when they are dissatisfied with the status quo to attain what they consider justifiable ends, despite economic or humanitarian considerations, which would otherwise deter an armed conflict. It speaks of the slide into authoritarianism and abuses of power during war times. And most of all it speaks of the inherent unpredictability of war; Saakashvili didn’t anticipate a sudden and decisive defeat, just as Putin probably didn’t anticipate a fierce resistance in Ukraine. This inability to anticipate events during war and how leaders will act and react in the heat of the moment is precisely why we should be concerned with escalation.
As Rice herself recently explained, I told Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili — privately — that the Russians would try to provoke him and that, given the circumstances on the ground, he could not count on a military response from NATO.
Some of my colleagues who served in government during this time still recall their fear that warnings from the State Department wouldn’t deter anyone, and that the U.S. government wasn’t doing enough to get ahead of the problem. For my own part, I doubt any messaging would have been sufficient to avert war between these two countries. The August War is a cautionary tale not just about a revanchist Russia, but also the fears and ambitions of small states, and the delusions of patrons who think they can control their partners.
The conflict in Ukraine seems to be heading into a long and bloody battle, now that Russia has focused on the eastern regions, where it seems to have more success. A war of attrition certainly – but ultimately whose side is time on? I have heard people on a podcast claiming that, with new weapons deliveries from the US, Ukraine would be able to outlast Russia on the battlefield – and I immediately thought: sure, you’re talking armament, but what about soldiers? Ukraine may have high morale, but will it have enough soldiers to contain and push back the Russian invading force? Even if they mobilize large parts of the (male) population, these new recruits won’t have the knowledge to operate modern weaponry, or the discipline to carry out military commands.
A protracted war would also continue to devastate Ukraine’s economy and population. Many women and children have fled to the western part of the country or to Europe – the longer the war continues, the less likely it is they will ever return home, after finding accommodation and jobs abroad. The villages and towns destroyed by Russian forces will take years to rebuild, and Ukrainian ports are blockaded by the Russian navy, so they cannot currently export or import goods over water. Whatever their losses on the battlefield, Russian troops will return to a largely intact country, albeit with fewer global companies and reduced international status, while Ukrainians will have to work to rebuild theirs.
I sometimes see commentators suggest that Russia’s high troop losses will ensure Moscow’s defeat in Ukraine, and I wonder if they’ve ever read about how Russia won its past wars.
— Kevin Rothrock (@KevinRothrock) May 25, 2022
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