22 April 2023

Foreign Policy: “A Realist Guide to World Peace”

I don’t have a formula for permanent peace up my sleeve, alas, but I do have an observation. A striking feature of most recent wars is how frequently they seem to backfire on the countries who start them. The days where major powers could start a big war and make dramatic strategic gains—as Japan did against Russia in 1905 or Bismarck’s Prussia did in the wars of German unification—seem to be behind us. Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein attacked Iran and invaded Kuwait and lost big both times. The United States invaded Iraq and Afghanistan and ended up in costly quagmires, and its intervention in Libya in 2011 produced a failed state. Israel’s intervention in Lebanon led to an 18-year occupation, one that ended no better than the United States’ long effort in Afghanistan.


I could go on, but you get the idea. The fact that starting wars rarely pays tells us something important about the modern world: a combination of nationalism, rapid diplomatic communications, a flourishing international arms market that can fuel resistance movements, an imperfect but widely accepted norm against conquest, the sobering effects of nuclear weapons, and the powerful tendency for states to balance against manifest threats may have combined to make most offensive wars a dubious proposition for the initiator. This fact hasn’t ended international competition—far from it—but there seem to be real limits to what even powerful states can accomplish by launching a war.

Stephen M. Walt

A valid remark, one that contradicts the widespread talking point that, should Russia prevail in its invasion of Ukraine, China will be emboldened to attack Taiwan – or, on the same veins, that Russia will rampage over Europe in an unstoppable invasion spree. Russia has been significantly weakened by this aggression, so the more pertinent lesson for China would be that an assault of Taiwan would have significant costs, both economically and in terms of soldiers lost, even before considering the different tactical landscape (the Russian army simply advanced on Ukraine on land, whilst China would have to mount an amphibious offensive on the shores of Taiwan).

A Peshmerga fighter flashes the sign for victory on top of an armoured vehicle
A Peshmerga fighter flashes the sign for victory on top of an armoured vehicle on the front line of fighting with Islamic State (IS) militants 20 kilometers east of Mosul, on August 18, 2014. Ahmad Al-Rubaye/AFP via Getty Images

That being said, we should not entirely rule out the possibility; after all, most analysts considered it unlikely and foolish that Russia would actually invade Ukraine – until it happened. We can’t assume that other states will constantly act in a rational manner, or make similar threat-reward calculations to us. Perhaps at some point Xi Jinping will look at the geopolitical situation (the US military bases in the region, the buildup of weapons in US-aligned Asian countries, a Taiwan further diverging from China’s intended path) and judge that the high risks of open warfare are justified by the potential reward, or that the window for a military intervention is closing fast.

I think another cultural development plays an important role in this increased aversion to war, namely rising secularism. Throughout history, military offensives have relied on masses of soldiers motivated by various ideologies based on concepts such as duty towards the country, the King, or God, and promising immaterial rewards like glorious afterlife or heroic statute in the county’s magnificent future. As religiousness eroded, people are more reluctant to abandon their immediate material comforts for nebulous promises, making it harder for militaries to recruit in droves.

A population may rise to defend its territory when attacked, but it’s much harder to stoke popular enthusiasm for an invasion. While they are not openly revolting against Putin, Russian are not exactly rushing to join the war effort; and I suspect the Chinese population is similarly more interested in material well-being than reunification with Taiwan by force. The wars of the future will probably be fought primarily with robots and autonomous machines to insure minimal involvement from the general public.

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